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What is the Data Encryption Standard (DES)? How it works

How DES works, why its 56-bit key failed in public, and where DES still hides in real networks: LM hashes, NTLMv1, Kerberos settings and SNMPv3.

By Updated 6 min read

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The Data Encryption Standard (DES) was the first openly published, government-approved cipher, and for twenty years it protected banking, government and corporate data. It was abandoned because its 56-bit key became cheap to brute-force. Yet DES still turns up on internal networks today, buried inside Windows authentication and old device settings, where it gives attackers an easy path to credentials.

This guide covers how DES works, how it was broken, and where to look for it on your own network.

A short history

In 1973 the US National Bureau of Standards (NBS, now NIST) asked for a standard cipher for unclassified government and commercial data. IBM submitted a design derived from its earlier Lucifer cipher, and after changes made in consultation with the NSA, it was published as FIPS 46 (opens in a new tab) in January 1977.

Two of those changes caused decades of argument:

  • The key was cut to 56 bits. Some Lucifer variants used 128-bit keys. Critics, notably Whitfield Diffie and Martin Hellman in 1977, argued 56 bits was within reach of a well-funded government and estimated a $20 million machine could search it in about a day.
  • The S-boxes were changed without explanation. Many suspected a backdoor. The opposite was true: when differential cryptanalysis was published around 1990, DES proved unusually resistant to it, and in 1994 IBM’s Don Coppersmith confirmed the team had known the technique since 1974 and designed against it.

DES was reaffirmed several times, with Triple DES preferred from 1999, and the standard was withdrawn in 2005.

How DES works

DES is a symmetric block cipher: one secret key encrypts and decrypts, and data is processed in 64-bit blocks.

  • Key: 64 bits, of which 8 are parity bits, so 56 bits of actual key.
  • Structure: a 16-round Feistel network.
  • Each round: the right half of the block (32 bits) is expanded to 48 bits, XORed with a 48-bit round key, passed through eight S-boxes (which map 6 bits to 4 bits and are the only non-linear step), permuted, and XORed into the left half. Then the halves swap.
  • Initial and final permutations rearrange bits before and after the rounds. They add no security; they suited the hardware of the time.

Because of the Feistel structure, decryption is the same process with the round keys in reverse order. That made DES compact to build in hardware, which was its main design goal. For how it compares with its successor, see AES vs DES.

How it was broken

DES’s internals held up well. Its best-known analytic attacks, differential (Biham and Shamir, needing about 2^47 chosen plaintexts) and linear (Matsui, 1993, needing about 2^43 known plaintexts), were never practical. The key length was the problem, and the break happened in public:

Year Effort Time to find a key
1997 DESCHALL, thousands of volunteer PCs 96 days
1998 EFF’s Deep Crack, under $250,000 of custom hardware 56 hours
1999 Deep Crack plus the distributed.net volunteer network 22 hours 15 minutes
2006 COPACOBANA, 120 FPGAs for under $10,000 8.7 days on average

After Deep Crack, nobody could argue DES protected high-value data. Today the search is a cheap service, and DES keys protecting captured authentication traffic can be recovered for very little money.

Where DES still hides on real networks

DES rarely appears because someone chose it. It survives inside older protocols, and on Windows networks those protocols lead straight to credentials. These are the places an internal network penetration test looks.

LM hashes

The LAN Manager hash, from the 1980s, uppercases the password, pads or truncates it to 14 characters, splits it into two 7-character halves, and uses each half as a DES key to encrypt a fixed string. Uppercasing and splitting mean each half can be cracked independently from a tiny search space, so an LM hash falls in minutes.

Windows has not stored LM hashes by default since Vista and Server 2008. They still appear where old domains, policies or systems predate that change, and where passwords haven’t been changed since.

Check: the Group Policy setting “Network security: Do not store LAN Manager hash value on next password change” should be enabled, and old accounts should have had a password change since.

NTLMv1

NTLMv1’s challenge-response takes the account’s 16-byte NT hash, pads it to 21 bytes, splits it into three 7-byte DES keys, and encrypts the server’s 8-byte challenge with each. The third key has only 2 unknown bytes and falls instantly; the other two are ordinary 56-bit DES keys. An attacker who can make a client authenticate to them with a chosen challenge can recover the NT hash, which is enough to authenticate as that user through pass-the-hash.

Microsoft has removed NTLMv1 from Windows 11 version 24H2 and Windows Server 2025, but older systems still allow it, and a single legacy printer or application is often the reason it’s left on.

Check: set “Network security: LAN Manager authentication level” to “Send NTLMv2 response only. Refuse LM & NTLM”, after auditing which systems still use NTLMv1.

Kerberos DES encryption types

Kerberos in Active Directory once supported DES encryption types. They have been disabled by default since Windows 7 and Server 2008 R2, and RFC 6649 (opens in a new tab) deprecated them in 2012. They come back when an account has “Use Kerberos DES encryption types for this account” ticked, or a compatibility policy re-enables them for an old system.

Check: search for accounts with the DES flag set in userAccountControl, and review the “Configure encryption types allowed for Kerberos” policy.

SNMPv3 with DES privacy

SNMPv3’s original security model (RFC 3414 (opens in a new tab)) specified CBC-DES for encrypting management traffic. AES was added later (RFC 3826 (opens in a new tab)), but many switches, routers and printers are still configured with DES, sometimes because it was the default when they were installed.

Check: review device configurations for priv des or equivalent, and move to AES-128 or stronger.

Old VPN and application settings

IPsec and SSL VPN profiles, file-transfer integrations and in-house code (look for DES or DESede in source) left on DES or 3DES because “it works”. The fix is the same everywhere: find it, move to AES-GCM, and set a date for anything that can’t move yet.

Why this matters more than the cipher

On a modern network, DES is rarely protecting data that anyone wants to decrypt. It matters because of what it protects: password hashes and authentication exchanges. Recovering one domain administrator’s NT hash through NTLMv1 can be the step between an attacker’s first foothold and control of the whole domain. That’s why these settings are high-value findings in internal testing, even though each is “just” a legacy option.

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